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Marc Sommers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Fellow) and African Studies Center, Boston 
University (Visiting Researcher), United States
Although Africa has a youth-dominated population, African government policies are often not youth-centered and African governments and their international 
supporters are frequently under-informed about the priorities of most youth. Reliance on the “youth bulge and instability thesis” leads to distorted assess-
ments of everyday realities. Examination of the lives, priorities, and cultural contexts of African youth, and the cases of youth in Rwanda and Burundi in par-
ticular, shows that the nature of relations between the state and massive populations of young, marginalized, and alienated citizens directly impacts the 
governance, security, and development prospects of African nations.
1. Learning from Liberia
If ever there was a youth-dominated conflict in modern 
times, it was Liberia’s long and grueling civil war 
(1989–1996, and again in 2000–2003). Ignited by Charles 
Taylor’s Christmas Eve incursion from neighboring Côte 
d’Ivoire late in 1989, together with perhaps one hundred 
other men, the conflict soon took the form of youth-led 
chaos. “What initially was seen as a revolution … fought 
with sticks and cutlasses,” Utas writes, “was eventually 
transformed into a war of terror where young people 
started fighting each other” (2005: 55). In fact, some youth 
continued to view the war as their revolution, for as long as 
they were able to take advantage of the opportunity that 
armed conflict afforded. The civil war provided them with 
“a chance to become someone in a national system that had 
marginalized them, but also a chance to get rid of the load 
of work and expectations that the parental generation had 
laid on them” (65). Some of the more successful young sol-
diers, sometimes goaded by their girlfriends, “felt so af-
fluent that they could wash their cars in beer – a beverage 
most could not even afford to drink prior to the war – and 
that they could drive a car until it ran out of gasoline and 
then just dump it for another one” (66). The result was a 
war that wreaked colossal destruction. By 1997, civil war 
had already left a nation of perhaps two and a half million 
with up to 200,000 dead, 700,000 refugees, and much of the 
remaining population internally displaced (Utas 2008: 113).
The region of Sub-Saharan Africa has the most youthful 
population in the world. Of the forty-six countries and ter-
ritories where at least seventy percent of the population is 
under the age of 30, only seven are not in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica (Leahy et al. 2007: 87–91). With this in mind, one of 
the most striking aspects of contemporary Africa is how 
male African youth have so frequently been viewed as 
threats to their own societies. However, the view from 
below differs dramatically from the largely quantitative 
analyses from above and from outside the continent. Again, 
the Liberian example is illuminating. A nation long re-
nowned for grasping leaders and withered government in-
stitutions has more recently provided truly upbeat signs of 
forward movement. That said, most youth continue to be 
left far, far behind. Fieldwork in rural Liberia uncovered a 
widespread fear of “rebel behavior youth” – youth who had 
assumed the attitudes of wartime combatants and became 
socially sidelined (Sommers 2007b: 1). Liberia’s post-war 
youth unemployment has been estimated at the aston-
ishing rate of 88 percent (Government of Liberia 2004: 7). 
Taking all of this into account – a widespread sense of es-
trangement and social distance felt by many youth and an 
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economic recovery that is passing most of them by – one 
could certainly argue that Liberian youth are among the 
world’s most peaceful populations.
Just why most Liberian youth, and a great many other Afri-
can youth, are not viewed as mostly peaceful underscores 
the central argument of this paper: that African govern-
ments, and the international donor agencies that support 
them, are generally under-informed about the priorities of 
marginalized youth majorities. While Africa may have an 
exceptionally youth-dominated population, African gov-
ernment policies are often not youth-centered. As a result, 
and quite unintentionally, this collective stance runs the 
risk of making Africa less, not more, secure. I begin by 
examining the implications of today’s exceptionally youth-
ful population demographics, paying particular attention 
to arguments and oversights concerning connections be-
tween today’s youth bulge and instability. Next, I examine a 
crucial literature that is often overlooked: that which il-
luminates vital issues that inform youth lives in war-af-
fected Africa. I further probe these issues by comparing 
youth realities and priorities in the neighboring Central Af-
rican countries of Rwanda and Burundi. The conclusion 
returns to a central concern of proponents of the youth 
bulge and instability thesis: whether such “bulges” threaten 
internal security.
2. Assessing the Youth Bulge and Instability Thesis
“The current cohort of young people in developing coun-
tries,” the World Bank forthrightly states, “is the largest the 
world has ever seen.” About half the world’s people are 
under age twenty-five, 1.5 billion of them are youth, and 86 
percent of them live in the developing world (World Bank 
2006: 33, 4). The situation is even more pressing in war-
torn nations, where youth cohorts challenge efforts to re-
build governments, societies, and peace. Virtually all wars 
in the world today take place in demographically “young” 
nations (Leahy et al. 2007: 24). Sub-Saharan Africa stands 
at the intersection of these and related trends: its youth 
population growth rate is the highest of any region (World 
Bank 2006: 33), some of its nations are currently impacted 
by conflict or have been recently, and the expansion of its 
urban areas “has no precedent in human history” (Caraël 
and Glynn 2008: 124).
“In many sub-Saharan African countries,” Eguavoen notes, 
“young people already represent the majority share of the 
population pyramid, which is referred to as the ‘youth 
bulge’” (2010: 268). However, the paucity of first-hand in-
formation about African youth in general, and the majority 
of youth who are poor and marginal in particular, has 
opened the door for policy development to be informed by 
narrowly conceived data and misguided assumptions about 
youth. Many of these assumptions have been powerfully 
influenced by the above-mentioned youth bulge dis-
cussion. While this demographic phenomenon is currently 
present in a great many developing nations, most scholarly 
and policy references to the youth bulge highlight the “ex-
tremely robust” correlation between countries with youth 
bulges and the incidence of political instability (Urdal 
2004: 16). Cincotta, for example, confidently states: “As 
one might expect, and as numerous studies have shown, 
populations with excessive numbers of young people invite 
a higher risk of political violence and civil strife than 
others” (2008: 80–81).
The idea of youth or young people as, essentially, looming 
terrors, regularly invites exceptionally bleak and frighten-
ing imagery. In an article with the unnerving title, “The 
New Population Bomb,” Goldstone cites “Cincotta and 
other political demographers” who assert that “countries 
with younger populations are especially prone to civil un-
rest and are less able to create or sustain democratic in-
stitutions. And the more heavily urbanized, the more such 
countries are likely to experience Dickensian poverty and 
anarchic violence” (2010). On the other hand, Cincotta 
also predicted the rise of democratic movements in North 
Africa. “The first (and perhaps most surprising) region 
that promises a shift to liberal democracy,” he announces 
with, it turns out, remarkable prescience, “is a cluster along 
Africa’s Mediterranean coast: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, and Egypt, none of which has experienced democ-
racy in the recent past” (2008: 82).
In addition to security concerns that are attached to youth 
in war and post-war Africa, there are additional appre-
hensions about Africa’s urban youth. An Office of Conflict 
Management and Mitigation (USAID) publication states 
this frankly: “Urbanization concentrates precisely that de-
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mographic group most inclined to violence: unattached 
young males who have left their families behind and have 
come to the city seeking economic opportunities” (2005: 7).
African cities have also seemed to have ignited a series of 
positively doom-laden responses from Western observers. 
From Alex Shoumatoff, for example, we receive speculation 
about a dangerous irrationality spreading through male 
urban youth minds in Africa (1988: xiv):
It is only when large cities begin to appear in the [African] lands-
cape … that a societal madness begins to occur; that detribalized 
young men, lost souls wandering in the vast space between the 
traditional and modern worlds, can be heard howling in the 
streets of downtown Nairobi in the middle of the night.
Much more famously, Robert D. Kaplan spoke of male 
youth in urban West Africa as “loose molecules in an un-
stable social fluid that threatened to ignite” (1996: 16). 
Echoing Shoumatoff, that “social fluid” is of a menacing, 
urban kind, divested of “certain stabilizing cultural mod-
els” that are anchored in rural areas. Relying on the sort of 
purple prose that can make one’s stomach churn, Kaplan 
also extemporizes on the muck of West African city life. 
Forced by a flat tire to take in his surroundings, Kaplan 
highlights (62):
the piles of garbage, the empty shelves in the single store, the 
buzzing flies, the vacant and surly stares of the numerous young 
men hanging out until our flat tire gave them something useful 
to do, the sheer nothingness of it all. Life went on, babies were 
being conceived and born, and yet little was created, or even re-
paired, beyond the bare necessities. This was a timeworn life ba-
sed on high infant mortality and low life expectancy.
The – for Kaplan – unnerving presence of many young 
men in African cities seems to have inspired him to make 
the following influential prediction: that “the perpetrators 
of future violence will likely be urban born, with no rural 
experience from which to draw” (12).
Kaplan’s take on Africa and Africans has proven influential 
indeed. Not only has his use of West Africa as a lens for 
predicting a frightening future sustained a cottage industry 
of commentators over the years, it has also, reportedly, 
proven remarkably influential with policymakers. As 
Dunn, one of a plethora of Kaplan critics, notes: “The fact 
that Kaplan’s article has become part of the USA’s foreign 
policy vision of the world makes it highly alarming” (2004: 
497). In dramatic, compelling prose, Kaplan evidently 
voiced widely felt, but privately held, revulsions and terrors 
– and made them stick.
Significantly, such theorizing is taking place without inter-
views with the African male youth about which the theor-
izers are so concerned. What is their take on urban life, or 
life anywhere, for that matter? The sense that observers may 
be jumping to conclusions is reinforced by Kaplan’s tenden-
cy to observe male youth instead of talk to them. Viewing 
from afar, for example, Kaplan claims that “the robust health 
and good looks” of youth in urban West Africa (and it is 
clearly male youth he is talking about) “made their predica-
ment sadder” (1996: 16). Kaplan bases his assessment on the 
opposite of what he observes. It is far more likely that some-
thing is amiss in such analyses, that the actual reality male 
youth inhabit diverges from such speculative assertions. In 
this case, it appears that the dread of African male youth in 
cities substitutes for evidence-based analysis.
What might be called the “youth bulge and instability the-
sis” is typically used to illuminate what its proponents con-
sider the central threat to political stability in post-war 
countries: male youth (shortly we will also examine what 
might be called the “urban threat thesis,” which views 
urban youth as the principal potential youth menace). At 
the same time, it is indeed difficult not to sense strongly 
that something is seriously amiss with these arguments. For 
one thing, a correlation linking disproportionately high 
numbers of youth to political instability does not demon-
strate a causal relationship. This is not to say that this 
renders the tenets of the youth bulge and instability thesis 
irrelevant. On the contrary, Urdal, Cincotta, Goldstone, 
and others have established that the correlation between 
the two has validity. We should indeed be concerned about 
nations with weak governments and economies that have 
exceptionally youthful populations. However, a correlation 
alone has limited explanatory power and provides an in-
complete and fairly distorted picture of broader realities.
Contextual evidence invites added challenges to the de-
scriptive power of the youth and instability thesis and the 
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urban threat thesis. Some of the assertions that proponents 
have brought forth are weakly supported. For example, the 
relationship between “too many youth” and violent in-
stability has been buttressed, in part, by the assertion that 
young men are “inherently violent” (Cincotta et al. 2003: 
44). However, biological research challenges this claim 
(Rowe et al. 2004). Additionally, a great majority of African 
nations with youth bulge populations have not experienced 
recent civil conflicts. Furthermore, when civil conflicts do, 
in fact, arise in African countries with youth bulges, “the 
vast majority of young men never get involved in violence” 
(Barker and Ricardo 2006: 181). Moreover, most of the re-
cent African wars are now over – Angola, Burundi, Liberia, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and so 
on – despite all of them taking place in countries that still 
have youth bulge demographics. Finally, a commonly cited 
predictor of instability and war that lies at the core of the 
urban threat thesis – the concentration of large numbers of 
unemployed male youth in cities – is confronted by the fact 
that most recent armed conflicts in Africa began and were 
largely fought in rural areas of the countries involved (such 
as Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, 
South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda).
Given that the predictors of unrest and instability are in 
evidence in country after country across Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca – such as populations infused with youth bulge demo-
graphics and high rates of urbanization – the fact that so 
many wars have ended, and that things are not far, far more 
unstable across the region, directly challenges both the 
youth bulge and instability and the urban threat ar-
guments. The absence of the voices of ordinary male and 
female youth themselves in the debates helps explain just 
why these two statistical, correlation-based arguments have 
so many weaknesses. What accounts for the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of youth do not engage in wartime 
violence? If African cities are magnets for unemployed 
male youth, then why are the cities they inhabit not far 
more unstable? Since the predictive power of the youth 
bulge and instability thesis, in particular, is so inexact and, 
apparently, weak, then to what extent should we rely on it?
Exactly what, in short, are we supposed to be so concerned 
about? One senses that a fear of male youth, however sub-
conscious, may inform at least some of the damning pre-
dictions and unnerving descriptions. As Gavin notes: “Any 
discussion of the youth bulge in Africa risks veering into 
the land of breathless alarmism – young men and street 
gangs and guns, oh my!” (2007: 70). Developing policies 
that build on the youth bulge and instability thesis and/or 
the urban threat thesis will probably prove counterpro-
ductive if they incorrectly color most male youth as men-
acing and encourage unproven assertions about how male 
and female youth think and act. They may also support 
“dangerous discourses of ‘savage,’ ‘barbaric,’ and (above 
all) ‘dangerous’” male youth in unstable and conflict-af-
fected countries (Scheper-Hughes 2006: 315). After all, the-
orizers tend to focus on certain kinds of male youth, 
especially those who are unemployed and live in cities in 
Africa and the Middle East.
3. Literature on African Youth Realities
It is well worth considering that a fundamental shortcom-
ing appears to exist in the youth bulge and instability liter-
ature – the limited nature (or complete absence) of 
information about how youth view their own situation and 
what motivates them to make life-altering choices. Pro-
found marginalization and the social construction of mas-
culinity can figure prominently in such decisions. The 
social exclusion of youth is a recurring structural feature of 
many societies and communities (as in Rwanda: Uvin 
1998; Sierra Leone: Richards 1996; and Liberia: Utas 2005 
and 2008). While mention of the social, political, and econ-
omic marginalization of most young people in war and 
post-war societies is now commonplace (Ebata et al. 2005), 
the threats facing many youth in unstable and war-affected 
contexts – “the near-invisibility of female youth and the 
emasculation of male youth” (Sommers 2007a: 113) – re-
main under-examined.
Adulthood and masculinity expectations and pressures can 
also profoundly influence youth decisions and their out-
look on the future. Utas describes a “crisis” facing many 
young men in Liberia who are unable to become socially 
accepted as men because they have been unable to achieve 
the cultural mandates of building their own house and 
then getting married. The males who had chronologically 
outgrown youth were thus becoming not men but 
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“youthmen” (Utas 2005: 150). Governments can ex-
acerbate the promotion of male youth frustration in a 
number of ways, including making access to land and non-
farm employment difficult. This can severely reduce the 
ability of male youth to marry and become men (Uvin 
1998).
While much research has noted that male youth who are 
caught in inescapable positions of social failure may turn 
to desperate, even violent, action (Correia and Bannon 
2006), the “the indigenous sources of strength” (individual, 
familial, and community) that “allow or keep young men 
out of conflict” are “nearly absent” from discussion and re-
search (Barker and Ricardo 2006: 175). Speaking of Burun-
di, Uvin argues that (2008: 178):
when young men face great difficulty in achieving normative 
manhood, they do what most of us do when confronted with 
major challenges in our lives – they try harder than ever, they 
seek to innovate, they try to move and find opportunities elsew-
here, they turn to God for strength, they hang out with friends 
and complain – but they do not necessarily become murderers.
Many if not most African male youth, in short, resist en-
gagement in violence and demonstrate remarkable resil-
ience in the face of dire circumstances (Boyden and de 
Berry 2004; Annan et al. 2008).
The situation facing female youth is similarly serious, since 
attaining a respectable and hence more protected form of 
womanhood is typically attainable only if there are men 
available to marry (Coulter 2009; Stites, Akabwai, and Ma-
zurana 2007). The phase of prolonged delay before male 
and female youth can marry and become seen as adults 
has been called “waithood,” during which youth find 
themselves confined in “an adolescent, liminal world 
where they are neither children nor adults” (Singerman 
2007: 6). In the absence of marriage, and since female 
youth tend to have significantly fewer economic options 
than their male youth counterparts, involvement in irregu-
lar or risky income-generation, including prostitution, is 
often their only means of survival (Angola: de Barros 
2005; Rwanda: Sommers 2012). An additional threat is 
what Nordstrom has termed the “invisibility” of girls and 
young women in war-affected contexts, in which a “veil of 
silence” descends and makes it difficult to access the trials 
and alarming vulnerabilities that girls and female youth 
endure (1999: 75).
Sadly, fear and presumption appear often to make poor fe-
male youth virtually imperceptible and transform young 
men, particularly those in African cities, into an undif-
ferentiated mass of security threats.1 Speaking to members 
of the marginalized youth majorities in urban or rural Af-
rica invokes an entirely different view of contemporary Af-
rica: one where innovation and resourcefulness 
characterize the increasingly separate social worlds of Afri-
can youth; where humiliation hounds many male youth 
who are simply unable to become men; where far too many 
female youth endure desperate and strikingly overlooked 
lives; where governments are seen as predatory and riddled 
with corruption and nepotism; and where older gener-
ations grow more and more detached from the younger 
generation. After examining how agencies and – much 
more crucially – societies define what it means to be a 
youth, we will turn to cases that illuminate some of these 
tendencies. For the fortunes of youth in two Sub-Saharan 
African countries – Rwanda and Burundi – are strongly in-
fluenced by the combined impact of two critical factors: 
the nature of governance and culture.
4. Between Ages and Cultures: The Challenge of Defining Youth
Before we embark on examinations of ordinary youth in 
two Sub-Saharan African nations, we must clarify what is it 
that we mean by “youth.” While it is hardly a pedestrian 
concern, the definition is also, unquestionably, a moving 
target. The United Nations, for example, defines youth as 
“persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years.” At the same 
time, the UN also states that its definition is “for statistical 
purposes” and “without prejudice to other definitions by 
Member States.” In other words, while it was necessary to 
1 Extended discussions of Africa’s youth bulge 
and security concerns can be found in Sommers 
2006 and Sommers 2007a.
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arrive at an age range so that statistics could be gathered, it 
is accepted that individual states may have their own de-
finitions (ECOSOC n.d.). And so they have: the African 
Union, to name just one example, defines youth as persons 
aged 15 to 34 years (Eguavoen 2010: 268). At the same 
time, USAID observes that “The UN system defines young 
people [as distinct from “youth”] as persons in the 
10–24-year age group.” Young people, USAID explains, 
“includes both adolescents, ages 10–19, and youth, ages 
15–24” (USAID n.d.).
Beyond the welter of age-based definitions of youth, there 
are cultural classifications for youth and adult. Instead of 
an age range, the challenge of passing into adulthood 
stands out. It is not easy to achieve. Eguavoen summarizes 
substantial academic literature on African youth defini-
tions and finds that they are exacting (2010: 268):
In academic debates, youth is understood as a social category 
that assembles individuals in the social transition stage between 
childhood and adulthood . . . as well as ‘adults without adult sta-
tus’, meaning individuals who have not succeeded in establis-
hing themselves socially as adults by getting married, finding 
their own household and/or being able to take economic care of 
themselves and dependants.
In addition, exiting the culturally defined category of 
“youth” may not be permanent. One must return to 
“youthhood” if one fails to maintain one’s status of 
“adult.” As Eguavoen explains (ibid.):
There is growing empirical evidence that the social status of 
adulthood may be reversed if the individual falls back into po-
verty, which means that young adults are socially delegated back 
to youth status and, as a direct consequence, denied full adult 
rights, again resulting in low social status and limited access to 
resources and political decision making.
Gender dimensions are also crucial in movements between 
being a youth and an adult, since “African women usually 
have a shorter time within the period identified as youth 
(from puberty to 18 or 19 years old), because they tend to 
marry at a younger age than men and thus receive the so-
cial status of adulthood earlier than their male counter-
parts” (Eguavoen 2010.: 268–69). To be sure, there are cases 
in Africa where adulthood can be achieved in other ways. 
But as we will see, much depends on whether cultural 
mandates and expectations are rigid (as in Rwanda) or 
more flexible (as in Burundi).
5. Views from Below: The Cases of Rwanda and Burundi
African cultural definitions of what it means to be a youth 
and how a youth might enter adulthood differ by gender 
and create the risk of engendering public disapproval for 
youth who fail to achieve and maintain the cultural pre-
requisites of adulthood. What the cases of Rwanda and Bu-
rundi reveal is how dominant the threat of failed 
adulthood can be for youth, and how governments can 
play a decisive role in determining whether youth fail or 
succeed in this seminal quest.
Just as it was before the devastating genocide of 1994, 
Rwanda is again widely seen as a model of development 
(Sebarenzi 2009; Uvin 1998: 1–2; International Devel-
opment Association 2009: 1). Laudatory prose is routinely 
reserved for Rwanda and its current government. In 
Kinzer’s words (2008: 2), Rwanda has
recovered from civil war and genocide more fully than anyone 
imagined possible and is united, stable, and at peace. Its leaders 
are boundlessly ambitious. Rwandans are bubbling over with a 
sense of unlimited possibility. Outsiders, drawn by the chance to 
help transform a resurgent nation, are streaming in.
Cooke sums up Rwanda’s internationally-inspired glow, 
noting that the Rwandan government’s “expressed vision of 
national reconciliation through development and service de-
livery has won accolades from the international community” 
(2011: 1). While warnings about and condemnation of ex-
tensive government repression and human rights violations 
have also come to the fore (for example, Reyntjens 2004 and 
2011), it is the image of Rwanda rising from the ashes of ge-
nocide that has captured the imagination of most.
The same cannot be said for its neighbor to the south, Bu-
rundi. There, in the aftermath of an extremely violent, des-
tructive, and generally overlooked civil war, Burundi, 
despite its movement into post-war democracy, remains 
plagued by the poor reputation of its government. Kron 
contrasts conditions in these two countries, which have 
similar languages, colonial histories, cultures, and sets of 
ethnic groups, commenting that, “in contrast to orderly 
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Rwanda, the darling of the international aid community, 
Burundi is violent, dysfunctional, and chaotic.” Signific -
ant ly, Kron adds: “On the plus side, civil society in Burundi 
is indigenous and true, and unlike in Rwanda, ethnicity is 
not being ignored. Politics can breathe” (2010: 2).
The striking contrasts between Rwanda and Burundi are re-
vealed in research conducted by myself and a colleague, 
Peter Uvin (Sommers and Uvin 2011; Sommers 2012; and 
Uvin 2009), based on nearly identical sets of qualitative 
questions, as well as very similar samples of rural and 
urban, and male and female youth, the procedures for 
which we devised together. What our research collectively 
uncovered largely contradicts the reputed realities in the 
two countries: the general situation and outlook of Rwan-
dan youth was bleak, while their Burundian counterparts, 
while materially just as poor, had outlooks that were vastly 
more upbeat and optimistic. In Burundi, “generally weak 
governance and social tolerance toward manhood mandates 
provides space for many youth to generate trajectories of 
their own.” Meanwhile, in Rwanda, many youth are “risk 
averse and tied to a future where public failure appears 
likely” (Sommers and Uvin 2011: 2).
In both Rwanda and Burundi, the culturally mandated 
norms for adulthood were similar: to become socially ac-
cepted and recognized as a man, a male youth must build 
his own house before marrying and starting a family. For 
female youth, being an adult is culturally defined by mar-
riage and then having children. But in Rwanda, most youth 
are failing to make significant progress towards adulthood. 
Field research there found that there is a severe housing cri-
sis in the country and government regulations contribute 
significantly to making it unusually difficult for most male 
youth to complete a house. As a result, most male youth are 
failing to achieve the first step towards socially recognized 
manhood. Meanwhile, a female cannot become a woman 
until she has someone to marry. For most, they are forced 
to wait for male youth to finish building a house – which 
many are unlikely to achieve. The pressure on female youth 
is acute, since it is illegal to marry before age 21. But by 
their mid-twenties, male youth may view them as too old 
to marry. When this occurs, a female youth faces a future as 
a spinster and social outlier (Sommers and Uvin 2011: 3).
Although the ideals of normative manhood (and, for that 
matter, womanhood) were similar in Burundi, it was not 
the central focus of male youth lives there. Unlike Rwanda, 
where strict government housing regulations contributed 
significantly to failed manhood, and where cultural man-
dates were unyielding, the prospect of social failure and 
public humiliation as failed adults did not threaten male 
and female youth in Burundi. Burundians “widely ac-
cepted that [adulthood] could not be perfectly achieved, 
and were willing to accommodate alternatives” (Sommers 
and Uvin 2011: 4). Ultimately, our comparative analysis re-
vealed that “most Burundian youth believe that they have 
options and possibilities while most Rwandan youth do 
not.” While the Rwandan government is lauded for being 
“simultaneously progressive and prodevelopment,” re-
search with Rwandan youth found that it is also “inter-
ventionist and controlling” (9). Together with rigid 
cultural requirements and real threats of public humili-
ation, most of Rwanda’s youth are stuck in a situation 
where failure is likely – and difficult to avoid. One way to 
sidestep it is for rural youth to migrate to the capital, Kiga-
li. Yet in Rwanda, shifting to the city was “mainly a desti-
nation for the desperate, not the inquisitive or the 
dynamic” as was essentially the situation for their counter-
parts in Burundi (7). Not surprisingly, while Burundian 
youth “held out the hope of improving their lot and per-
haps even ascending socially,” most Rwandan youth aimed 
“to minimize their chances of collapse” (8).
Rwanda’s combination of a strict, strong, and controlling 
government, and a society that adheres to rigid cultural ex-
pectations, leaves most of its youth risk averse and facing 
the prospect of failing to gain social acceptance as adults. 
In contrast, Burundi’s comparatively weak government 
does not appear to play much of a role in Burundian youth 
lives. At the same time, the government’s minimal pre-
sence, together with the fact that society views adulthood 
norms as flexible and adaptable, rather than rigid and uny-
ielding, gave Burundian youth room to move. The punish-
ing set of circumstances that surrounded Rwandan youth 
simply does not exist for Burundian youth. Taken together, 
there appear to be some benefits to having a weak govern-
ment – provided a youth is ambitious and enterprising, 
and as long as society supports rather than condemns 
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youth who struggle and perhaps even fail to meet cultur-
ally-defined adulthood requirements.
6. Conclusion
Is the youth bulge a threat to state internal security? Per-
haps. Urdal argues that the determining factor is not youth 
but economic opportunity: “If young people are left with 
no alternative but unemployment and poverty, they are in-
creasingly likely to join a rebellion as an alternative way of 
generating an income” (2007: 92). Urdal’s argument, how-
ever, requires context, since most unemployed and impov-
erished young Africans do not become security threats 
even when opportunities for enrichment arise. There is, in 
addition, scant information on how and why most margi-
nalized African youth resist engagement in violence even 
when it would seem to provide immediate benefits. Focus-
ing on youth demographics, moreover, runs the risk of 
overlooking other crucial security concerns, such as illicit 
drugs and small arms. The easy availability of drugs and 
arms can fuel conflicts and influence youth behavior. Both 
can aid youth recruitment into gangs and militias.
A starting point for donor nations is not to make unstable 
governance unintentionally worse. While such a result is 
not intentional, supporting government policies and pro-
grams that make the lives of profoundly marginalized 
youth majorities even more marginal creates the risk of 
undermining government institutions and increasing frus-
tration and despair within youthful populations. Such situ-
ations can threaten the credibility of states and foment 
instability. They are also environments in which gangs and 
militias can be found, although not necessarily: recent re-
search in urban Rwanda, which has one of the youngest 
populations in the world and significant governance issues, 
did not uncover any evidence of gang activity (Sommers 
2012). However, even when opportunities for joining gangs 
and militias are present, such as in South Sudan, where they 
seem to be enlarging (Martin and Mosel 2011, Sommers 
and Schwartz 2011), few African youth are likely to do so.
That said, once a war starts, the availability of so many 
youth means that young fighters are easily replaceable. This 
appears to allow military outfits to send child and youth 
soldiers into high-risk situations and accept unusually high 
casualties. This is vividly illustrated by accounts from child 
soldier outfits, which may endure exceptionally high casu-
alties in battle before withdrawing. A former Liberian child 
commander explained how he had always obeyed his com-
mander’s order to continue advancing his contingent of 
250 child soldiers in battle until fifty had not been killed or 
wounded (field interview in Liberia, 2005). A Sierra Leo-
nean youth explained that he had been one of twenty 
children whom the Revolutionary United Front had ab-
ducted from his village. Weeks later, his commander in-
formed him that he would receive a military promotion. 
The reason was simple: he was the only one of the original 
twenty who was still alive (field interview in Sierra Leone, 
2010).2
The cases of Rwanda and Burundi clearly demonstrate 
what can occur when outsiders presume the situations of 
youth rather than investigate them. Rwanda’s mostly 
bubbly international reputation is not reflected in the 
everyday lives of its nonelite youth majority. In fact, their 
reality is virtually the reverse: dreadfully constricted and 
conspicuously overlooked. Indeed, it is necessary to con-
sider the possibility that a country containing so many 
young people with limited options and facing the prospect 
of public failure just might turn violent. To be sure, Burun-
di has its own share of troubles. But a constricted and con-
trolled youth cohort is not one of them.
What we are left with is the towering significance of gov-
ernance and culture – and the unavoidable necessity to 
find out, from ordinary, non-elite youth themselves, what 
their priorities are. An over-reliance on quantitative cor-
relations and journalistic observations runs the risk of 
missing basic forces that youth face. High quality, field-
based, qualitative research with members of non-elite, 
2 The exceptionally brutal tactics of child soldier 
commanders are detailed in excellent books on child 
soldiering, such as Honwana 2006, Rosen 2005, 
Singer 2005 and Wessells 2006.
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marginalized youth majorities in African countries must 
be conducted and then used to inform government and 
non-government policy and practice. This approach effec-
tively calls for ordinary youth priorities to inform govern-
ment and donor priorities explicitly and directly; a truly 
mighty task. But as qualitative research with Rwandan and 
Burundian youth reveals, what such research uncovers 
about the gap between institutional and youth priorities 
can be truly surprising.
One of the issues that solid qualitative research with ordi-
nary youth can shed light on is whether youth are able to 
achieve adulthood in their societies, and what happens to 
them if they fail. In worlds where youth strain to gain re-
cognition as adult contributors to society, the power of cul-
tural judgment to impact young lives must not be 
overlooked. Nor can a second option available to youth: 
shunning traditional adulthood expectations altogether, 
and living, as a consequence, in social outlier societies, such 
as Liberia’s so-called “rebel behavior youth,” whom I men-
tioned earlier (Sommers 2007b). Heavy reliance on elite 
youth leaders in civil society as “youth voices,” in addition, 
is almost always a mistake if tensions and suspicions divide 
elite youth minorities from vast nonelite youth majorities 
(such scenarios are common). Similarly, if youth programs 
unintentionally demonstrate exclusion by providing pro-
grams to the fortunate few in areas where most youth are 
desperate for any support, they may inadvertently make 
difficult situations even worse, most particularly for youth 
who are not program participants.
In addition, international actors may develop youth pro-
grams with a limited awareness of others in their midst. It 
has been my experience that Christian and Muslim relig-
ious organizations are quite often the main institutions that 
target poor urban youth for outreach and support. In rural 
areas, there may be other organizations reaching out to 
poor youth, but even there, religious organizations are often 
highly effective. An additional result can be a divide be-
tween poor youth who are members of a particular church 
or mosque and those who are not. Religious leaders can, of 
course, also rally youth for or against their government.
Which returns us to the governance issue. The Rwandan 
government’s strong accent on social control carries with it a 
significant downside. The lives of ordinary Rwandans are 
constricted. And although Burundi’s governmental weak-
nesses are not to be sought or aimed for – not in the slightest 
– the Rwandan government’s knack for squelching dissent 
and profoundly constraining individual life options cannot 
be overlooked. Indeed, a crucial challenge for democratizing 
African states lies in questions about their credibility before 
their own youthful and mostly marginalized populations. 
African youth cannot, by themselves, threaten the prospects 
for democratization within their countries. Presuming an 
inherent male youth threat is suspect and should never be 
allowed to overshadow other important security-related fac-
tors, such as the health of the nation’s economy, the degree 
to which young people are frustrated and endure social hu-
miliation, and, finally, the nature of the state’s relations with 
massive populations of youthful citizens.
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